Italy was the first and hardest-hit Western nation by the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). The identification of the first case, on 20th February, created widespread panic as residents in Italy began stockpiling food. Social media posts pictured near empty supermarket aisles. Soon after, this rush to hoard food spread across many other European nations. But those rushing to the supermarkets were the fortunate ones who could afford to do so. On 30th March, Pope Francis noted: 'We're beginning to see people who are hungry because they can't work',[@ckaa101-B1] and pleaded for help.

COVID-19 and the lockdown have placed the global economy under tremendous strain but are also increasing the threat of longer term food insecurity. Notwithstanding problems of cross-national data comparability, it is clear that food insecurity is already widespread in many high-income countries.[@ckaa101-B2] In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, an estimated 13.5 million European households were tipped into food insecurity,[@ckaa101-B3] while the current recession is already much deeper and is expected to last longer.[@ckaa101-B4]^,^[@ckaa101-B5]^,^[@ckaa101-B6]

There are two interlinked threats to food security. The first is food shortage, triggering price rises, and the second is an inequitable distribution of the food that is available. An early warning sign of both problems is the rising numbers of people turning to emergency foodbanks. In late March, the European Food Banks Federation asked its 29 country-members about how they were coping. Over 80% reported an increase in numbers seeking emergency food-assistance[@ckaa101-B7] alongside diminishing supplies of long shelf-life food being donated.[@ckaa101-B7]

Turning to the first threat, food production is being slowed and, in some cases, halted altogether. In Italy, for example, \>25% of food production relies on ∼370 000 regular seasonal workers from abroad. Border closures and the consequent halt in the movement of people pose the real threat that crops may be left to rot in the fields.[@ckaa101-B8] The Agricultural Association Secretary for Veneto said 'If we do not collect today, ...,the entire food-supply will come to a standstill'.[@ckaa101-B8] German, French and Dutch farmers are experiencing the same problems. This is happening at a time when the agricultural workforce is declining across Europe, with those that remain ageing rapidly. Currently, only 11% of farmers in the EU are under 40.[@ckaa101-B9]

The resulting shortages in raw agricultural goods can hamper production by those food companies that process and manufacture the food products that dominate supermarket shelves. The problem is compounded by measures adopted by some countries to safeguard domestic food supplies, limiting their exports,[@ckaa101-B10] placing even greater strain on countries which depend on food importation.

Prices of some staples, such as wheat and rice, the raw materials used to produce long-life products like pasta, have already increased by, respectively, about 15% and 17% since the beginning of 2020. This will raise prices faced by consumers who are already struggling to make ends meet from, as a result of the economic crisis. Recent years have seen a growing disconnect between rising food prices and stagnating wages, leading to a significant increase in food deprivation in Europe,[@ckaa101-B11] with the poor hardest hit.[@ckaa101-B11]

Second, we face a medium-term challenge arising from how many people's food habits have evolved during the pandemic, shifting production and consumption back into homes. For years, the food sector has been geared to producing food for large-scale catering, restaurants, schools and similar venues. Now, as people shift to home cooking, the market is transforming with customers seeking long-life products, rather than the fresh food.[@ckaa101-B10] In some countries, the market for fresh fish, with its limited shelf life, has almost collapsed. Meanwhile, food processors are having to redesign their production lines, with millers, for example, unable to meet demand for small bags of flour for home breadmaking. Survey data suggest that, even when the pandemic is over, many people will be reluctant to go to crowded restaurants.[@ckaa101-B12]

This change in eating patterns in many countries is likely to be prolonged and will take time for the food-production system to adapt.

We can identify two broad issues that policymakers must address. First, food policies must focus on producing quality food, improving diets and shortening supply-chains. On the one hand, short food chains reduce dependency from international trade, now recognized as being vulnerable to disruption in a crisis; on the other hand, short food chains can increase the quality and safety of the product, moving away from industrial scale production and from ultra-processed food.

Second, we need to rethink the agricultural workforce. Western Europe's agricultural system relies heavily on Eastern European seasonal workers, who work for low wages. The pandemic is forcing employers to ask whether this is sustainable, and whether they should not look instead to local workers. This will be difficult, requiring an acceptance that wages and working conditions will have to improve, with consequent increases in food prices. A possible solution, to avoid such a price hike, is to designate domestic farmers as essential frontline workers with preferential tax relief or subsidizing their work, which in turn will lead to an increase in their salaries without increasing the final price of food. It will also be necessary to find ways to adapt to the seasonal nature of the food, so increasing the resilience of local and national food systems to global shocks.

The COVID-19 pandemic is an opportunity to rethink the agricultural system in Europe and, especially, the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy that underpins it. It is an opportunity that must not be missed.

We are profusely indebted to Sandro Toffolutti and Joana Modureira Lima for useful discussion on the topic.
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